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Economy: The Case of Germany*
Conventional theory predicts that productivity gains lead to pay hikes. Pay increases,
however, can influence labor productivity. But what about in a corporatist economy?
Focusing on Germany, we use an innovative technique developed by Geweke to disentangle
the relationship between pay and productivity.
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1.

Introduction
Conventional theory predicts that productivity gains stimulate labor demand and drive up

pay. On the other hand, following a wage hike firms may rely more on capital, which could
boost output per worker. According to efficiency wage models, pay hikes can have a widespread impact on labor productivity by reducing turnover, boosting morale, or encouraging longterm employment (see the collection edited by Akerlof and Yellen, 1986). Productivity should
drive pay; likewise pay can influence productivity. But what about in a corporatist economy?
Corporatism is usually characterized as labor-management coordination in wage setting,
with industry- or economy-wide bargaining between union and employer federations. According
to critics, labor pacts are driven not so much by market forces, but institutional considerations
(see Olson, 1996). But it also has been argued that in a corporatist setting unions must account
for the external effects of their demands, making wages flexible (Calmfors and Driffil, 1988).
As European markets become more integrated, some observers have questioned whether
corporatism can survive there. To consider such a question, it is crucial to understand how pay
and productivity are related. Are industry-wide pay pacts responsive to changes in productivity?
Does corporatist consensus to boost pay help or hinder productivity? Such questions reflect an
identification problem, whether productivity gains are the result or the source of higher pay. To
overcome this problem we use a statistical method developed by Geweke (1982, 1984) to assess
bi-directional causality between time series. For the case of Germany, a prominent corporatist
country, we use the Geweke method to disentangle pay-productivity relationships.
2.

Collective Bargaining Structure in Germany
In the words of Paqué (1993, p. 209), Germany’s industrial relations are based on “tight

corporatism.” In an industry, collective agreements on wages and salaries are concluded between
a labor union and an employer federation. Typically, a labor pact is for twelve months, with the
annual bargaining round occurring in the first quarter of the year. Contract terms extend to
nonunion workers, so nearly 90 percent of all employees work under the terms of union
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contracts. The metal industry is especially critical. It encompasses motor vehicles, engineering,
and electronics, more than half of Germany’s industrial employment. In this key sector, the IG
Metall union negotiates with the Gesamtmetall employers’ association. Their contract
settlements often set a standard for others to follow.1
Given the industry-wide consensus necessary to reach labor settlements, it is not obvious
how responsive pay is to productivity gains. Cozy labor relations may make efforts to improve
productivity seem less crucial. Or perhaps an accord to raise pay is a signal, stimulating labor’s
efforts or encouraging accumulation of more capital.
3.

Geweke Linear Feedback Method: Overview
Geweke (1982, 1984) has developed measures of statistical feedback which also account

for any interdependence between time series, thereby extending Granger’s (1969) definition of
causality. This method can be used to disentangle the direction and magnitude of the linear
relationships between two time series, while controlling for any contemporaneous association.2
For the case of Germany, we apply Geweke’s feedback technique to measure the extent to
which adjustments in contractual pay have followed or led changes in productivity. The data
distinguish between wages of blue-collar workers and salaries of white-collar employees.
Therefore, we can assess how wage or salary settlements are related, if at all, to productivity.
Suppose there are two time-series vectors prd (productivity) and pay (pay specified in a
labor contract). Geweke (1982) decomposes linear dependence between the series into three
components: (1) feedback from prd to pay, (2) feedback from pay to prd, and
(3) contemporaneous association between the series.

1

For a particular geographic area of Germany (usually a federal state), a labor pact applies to
all firms in an industry. There is some firm-level bargaining, but most pacts are industry-wide.
See Berghahn and Karsten (1987) and Paqué (1993) for historical details.
2

Focusing on Japan, which has its own unique brand of coordinated labor relations, Fuess and
Millea (2002) used the Geweke method to evaluate wage setting in manufacturing.
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The interrelationship between pay and productivity is likely to differ according to labor
market conditions. The basic feedback method described below can be extended to include what
Geweke (1984) called conditioning information, that is, a control variable. Including such a
variable allows us to decompose pay and prd, conditional on different states of the labor market.
Germany has experienced different labor market trends over the years. Between 1960 and
1972 its unemployment tended to hover around 1 percent, falling as low as 0.7 percent. Since
1972 it has been trending steadily upward, from 1.1 percent (1972) to 10.5 percent (1998).
Presumably, the responsiveness of pay to productivity improvements may vary as unemployment
varies. Any efficiency consequences of pay changes are also likely to be different when
unemployment is rising.
A conditional forecast of productivity at time t (prdt) can be made using past values of
productivity (prdt-s), pay (payt-s), and unemployment (urt-s):
prdt = Σs=1 a1 (s)prdt-s + Σs=1 a2 (s)payt-s + Σs=1 a3 (s)urt-s + g1t,

(1)

where the a’s are coefficient vectors and g1t is the random prediction error with variance σ21.
To account for the marginal contribution of payt-s in the productivity forecast, we compare
the prdt forecast generated with the earnings series to a prediction created without the series.
Thus, we modify equation (1) and estimate prdt again:
prdt = Σs=1 b1 (s)prdt-s + Σs=1 b2 (s)urt-s + g2t,

(2)

where var (g2t) = σ22. Conditional feedback from pay to productivity is defined as
Fpay ºprd|ur / log (σ22 / σ21 ).

(3)

If the two variances are the same, then payt-s values do not improve the precision of the
productivity forecast, so Fpay ºprd|ur = 0.
For conditional feedback from productivity to pay, we estimate the following equations:
payt = Σs=1 a4(s)payt-s + Σs=1 a5(s)prdt-s + Σs=1 a6(s)urt-s + g3t,

(4)

payt = Σs=1 b3(s)payt-s + Σs=1 b4(s)urt-s + g4t,

(5)

where the prediction error variances are, respectively, σ23 and σ24. Conditional feedback from
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productivity to pay is simply
Fprd ºpay|ur / log (σ24 / σ23 ).

(6)

A distinguishing feature of the Geweke method is that it also accounts for any
simultaneous association that cannot be disentangled. To identify this contemporaneous
component, we modify the prdt forecast by also including current pay:
prdt = Σs=1 c1(s)prdt-s + Σs=0 c2(s)payt-s + Σs=1 c3(s)urt-s + g5t,

(7)

where var(g5t) = σ25. Including current earnings may improve the forecast’s precision. Thus, the
measure of contemporaneous association is
Fpay •prd|ur / log (σ21 / σ25 ).

(8)

If including current pay does not reduce the prediction error, then σ25 = σ21 and Fpay •prd|ur = 0,
meaning there is no contemporaneous association between the series.
Given the different types of feedback, we can disentangle pay and productivity. The
feedback measure Fprd ºpay|ur indicates whether productivity leads employee earnings, which
would be consistent with conventional labor demand. The measure Fpay ºprd|ur shows whether pay
leads productivity, that is, whether there are efficiency consequences from pay adjustments.
Finally, Fpay •prd|ur shows the extent of simultaneity between pay and prd.
The feedback measures defined above can be transformed into growth rates using the
formula [1 - exp(-F)]. For example, transforming Fpay ºprd|ur shows the proportional reduction in
the prediction error variance of prdt that can be attributed to past values of payt-s, conditional on
unemployment. In other words, the transformation illustrates the capacity of past earnings to
reduce the variance of prediction error in the productivity forecast.
4.

Disentangling Contractual Pay and Productivity in Germany

4.1.

Implementing the Geweke Method
The German Ministry of Labor publishes an index of the collectively bargained pay of

wage earners in trade and industry (gewerbliche Wirtschaft). Likewise, there is an index for the
collectively bargained pay of salary earners. The respective indices, available back to 1960,
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reflect the level of contractual pay for blue-collar and white-collar employees in German industry
(see appendix for data sources).
The German government also reports an index of labor productivity (real output per
gainfully employed person), which is available through 1998 (see appendix).3 Using the unemployment rate for western Germany as the labor market conditioning variable, for 1960-1998
we can analyze the interrelationship between productivity and contractual wages (salaries). We
determine if productivity changes in Germany have affected contractual wages or salaries.
Perhaps contractual pay hikes are a signal, leading to more effective labor efforts. So we
determine if pay changes have affected productivity.
In implementing the Geweke method, the forecast equations must be estimated with
stationary time series, otherwise the forecasts may be subject to spurious correlation. One may
wish to use productivity and pay levels to estimate the forecast equations. But using the PhillipsPerron (1988) unit root test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity for the prd
and pay series in levels. Their first-differences, however, are stationary. Thus, we used prd*t /
(prdt - prdt-1), pay*t / (payt - payt-1), which reflect changes in productivity and pay, respectively.
Unemployment is not stationary in levels-form either, but ur*t / (urt - urt-1) is stationary.
To obtain the prd*t and pay*t forecasts we used OLS regression.4 Then we computed the
feedback measures Fprd* ºpay**ur*, Fpay* ºprd**ur*, and Fpay* •prd**ur*. These feedback estimators are
consistent, but because they are based on variances they are nonnegative by construction and
potentially biased upward in small samples. Following the procedure developed by Cushing and
McGarvey (1990), we adjusted the point estimates for small sample bias and then created 90-

3

Our 1960-1998 sample period includes German reunification. To insure consistent series
over time, all data used in this study are only for western Germany (Früheres Bundesgebiet).
4

According to Akaike’s information criterion, for the forecast equations the optimal lag length
was one.
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percent confidence bands for each estimator.5 Using [1 - exp(-F)], we transformed the adjusted
feedback measures and associated confidence bands, which allows us to gauge the rate of change
in the prediction error variance of a forecast.
4.2.

Conditional Feedback Results
Table 1 presents conditional feedback measures, with results for wage earners in Panel A

and those for salaried employees in Panel B. In one respect the findings are similar: there is
little simultaneity between pay changes and productivity gains. The point estimates indicate
virtually no contemporaneous association between wg* (sl*) and prd*. There is, however,
meaningful directional feedback between the series.
Consider the impact of productivity on pay. The conditional feedback measures indicate
that changes in productivity lead changes in both contractual wages and salaries.
For wage earners (Panel A), the feedback point estimate shows that prd*t-s improves the
wg*t forecast by 7.3 percent. According to the confidence interval, the improvement could be as
great as 91.5 percent. The results are similar for salaried employees (Panel B). Looking at the
point estimate, prd*t-s reduces the prediction error variance of the sl*t forecast by 8.3 percent. The
confidence interval shows that the reduction may be as much as 72.9 percent.
Clearly, productivity changes lead to labor contracts that adjust both wages and salaries,
confirming conventional labor demand behavior.6 Industry-wide collective bargaining notwithstanding, both contractual wage and salary setting in Germany are consistent with classical
labor demand theory.

5

The adjusted feedback point estimates do not have associated test statistics. Following the
simulation process of Cushing and McGarvey (1990), we constructed bands to indicate the
potential magnitude of the feedback measures.
6

The conditional feedback measures show that prd*t-s leads wg*t and sl*t. Strictly speaking,
they do not verify that the impacts are positive. Using the impulse response method developed
by Sims (1980) ) which is often used to trace out the reaction of one time series to an impulse in
another series ) we confirmed that an innovation in prd* leads to wage and salary increases.
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Turning to the impact of pay on productivity, there is a difference between types of
employees. For blue-collar workers, changes in contractual wages have no effect whatsoever on
productivity growth. The conditional feedback point estimate is 0 percent, with the high value of
the confidence interval reaching a mere 0.8 percent.
Focusing on white-collar workers, the results are less clear cut. According to the point
estimate, sl*t-s has only a slight influence on the prd*t forecast. But the 90-percent confidence
interval shows that sl*t-s improves the prd*t forecast by as much as 48.9 percent. Including sl*t-s
can reduce considerably the prediction error variance of the prd*t forecast. Thus, there are
efficiency consequences following salary growth: bigger salary hikes for white-collar workers
can yield widespread improvements in productivity.7
Predictions of the demise of corporatism may be premature. Germany’s corporatist pay
setting has been responsive to market signals, with productivity gains stimulating wage and
salary increases. Moreover, salary increases for managers and executives can lead to efficiency
gains.
In an exhaustive study, Teulings and Hartog (1998) hypothesized that corporatism
enhances the efficiency of nominal contracts, because it is easier to adjust pay to aggregate
shocks. We find another possible efficiency benefit. Evidently pay can affect managerial
performance, and thus, labor productivity. It remains to identify more precisely how the
productivity improvements are achieved. Perhaps there is efficiency pay setting, with salary
increases motivating managers and executives to work harder or monitor workers more closely.
Or perhaps pay hikes lead managers to deploy factors of production more effectively. We would
expect future research to examine in detail the particular incentive effects of white-collar pay, to
identify the means by which salary adjustments stimulate productivity gains.

7

With impulse response analysis (see Sims, 1980), we confirmed that an innovation in sl*
leads immediately to bigger productivity gains.
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Appendix
Productivity. The index of real labor productivity is real output per gainfully employed
person. Figures for productivity growth are reported in [2], 1998 edition, Table 36; 1992 edition,
Table 40; see “Data References” below. Setting 1985 = 100, we constructed the index for 19601998.
Contractual Wages and Salaries. The index of collectively bargained (nominal) contract
wages for wage earners (Index der Tariflöhne) employed in trade and industry or regional
authorities is reported in [1], Table 5.1. Likewise, the index of collectively bargained salaries for
salary earners (Index der Tarifgehälter) is reported in [1], Table 5.1.
To generate real values, we deflated each index using the GDP deflator for western
Germany. Growth rates for the western German GDP deflator (base year, 1991) are reported in
[2], 1998 edition, Table 36; 1992 edition, Table 40. With these growth rates, we constructed an
index for the GDP deflator.
Unemployment. Unemployment rates for western Germany for 1960-1991 are reported in
[1], Table 2.10; for 1991-1998 the rates are reported in [2], 1999 edition, Table 23. In Germany,
the unemployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of
gainfully employed persons.
Data References.
1. Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. [BMA]. 2000. Statistisches
Taschenbuch ’99. Bonn: BMA [Translation: Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs.
Statistical Pocketbook ’99. Bonn: BMA].
2. Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln. [IDWK]. 1999. 1998. 1992. Zahlen zur
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ausgaben 1999, 1998, 1992.
Köln: IDWK [Translation: Institute of the German Economy Cologne. Figures for the
Economic Development of the Federal Republic of Germany. Editions for 1999, 1998, 1992.
Cologne: IDWK].
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Table 1
Disentangling Contractual Wages/Salaries and Productivity in
Western Germany, 1960-1998: Geweke Conditional Linear Feedback Measuresa
______________________________________________________________________________
Percent Reduction in the Prediction Error Variance of
Salary /Wage and Productivity Forecasts:
Adjusted Point Estimates (90-Percent Confidence Bands)
______________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Wage earners
Feedback Measuresb

Fprd* ºwg**ur*

Fwg* ºprd**ur *

Fwg* •prd**ur*

7.34
0.00
0.00
(2.66, 91.49)
(0.00, 0.76)
(0.00, 0.03)
______________________________________________________________________________
Panel B: Salary earners
Feedback Measuresb

Fprd* ºsl**ur*

Fsl* ºprd**ur *

Fsl* •prd**ur*

8.30
0.68
0.02
(3.16, 72.93)
(0.19, 48.85)
(0.01, 3.45)
______________________________________________________________________________
a

For sources of the salary, wage, productivity, and unemployment data, see the appendix.

b

On conditional feedback from productivity to earnings, see equations (4-6). For conditional

feedback from earnings to productivity, see equations (1-3). On contemporaneous association
between earnings and productivity, see equations (1, 7-8). In all cases, wg*t /(wgt - wgt-1);
sl*t /(slt - slt-1); prd*t /(prdt - prdt-1); ur*t /(urt - urt-1).

IZA Discussion Papers
No.

Author(s)

Title

Area

582

P. Cahuc
C. Gianella
D. Goux
A. Zylberberg

Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining
Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms

6

09/02

583

P. Cahuc
F. Fontaine

On the Efficiency of Job Search with Social
Networks

5

09/02

584

C. J. Heinrich
P. R. Mueser
K. R. Troske

Welfare to Temporary Work: Implications for
Labor Market Outcomes

3

09/02

585

M. Cervellati
U. Sunde

Human Capital Formation, Life Expectancy and
the Process of Economic Development

3

09/02

586

P. Díaz-Vázquez
D. Snower

On-the Job Training and the Effects of Insider
Power

3

09/02

587

H. Bonin
W. Kempe
H. Schneider

Kombilohn oder Workfare? Zur Wirksamkeit
zweier arbeitsmarktpolitischer Strategien

3

09/02

588

M. Frölich

Nonparametric IV Estimation of Local Average
Treatment Effects with Covariates

6

09/02

589

S. Jurajda
K. Terrell

Job Growth in Early Transition: Comparing Two
Paths

4

09/02

590

H. Görg
E. Strobl
F. Walsh

Why Do Foreign-Owned Firms Pay More?
The Role of On-the-Job Training

2

10/02

591

H. Görg
E. Strobl

Spillovers From Foreign Firms Through Worker
Mobility: An Empirical Investigation

1

10/02

592

J. Wagner

Testing Lazear’s Jack-of-All-Trades View of
Entrepreneurship with German Micro Data

5

10/02

593

T. K. Bauer
P. J. Dross
J. P. Haisken-DeNew

Sheepskin Effects in Japan

1

10/02

594

S. C. Wolter
M. Coradi Vellacott

Sibling Rivalry: A Look at Switzerland with
PISA Data

2

10/02

595

W. Arulampalam
A. L Booth
M. L. Bryan

Work-Related Training and the New National
Minimum Wage in Britain

3

10/02

596

H. Görg
E. Strobl

Relative Wages, Openness and Skill-Biased
Technological Change

2

10/02

597

S. M. Fuess, Jr.
M. Millea

Disentangling Pay and Productivity in a
Corporatist Economy: The Case of Germany

5

10/02

An updated list of IZA Discussion Papers is available on the center‘s homepage www.iza.org.

Date

